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Often labeled as the most deadly cri-
sis in Europe since WWII, the Yugoslav
Wars (1991-2002) were a series of ethnic
conflicts that facilitated the collapse of the
fragile Yugoslav federation created under
the Soviet model in 1946. One of these
conflicts, the Bosnian War (1992-1995),
was described by US assistant Secretary of
State Richard Holbroke as, “The greatest
failure of the West since the 1930s.”(Lamb,
2005) During the conflict in which Bosnian
Serbs waged an aggressive campaign of eth-
nic cleansing targeting Muslim (Bosniak)
and Croat populations, many of the es-
timated 1.4 million Bosnian refugees fled
to other former Yugoslav republics, where
they were subsequently subjected to more
ethnic conflict and violence.(Ministry of In-
terior of the Republic of Slovenia, 2007)
An estimated 650,000 refugees were able to
reach European countries beyond the for-
mer Yugoslavia and became the first group
to acquire “temporary protection” in EU
states as well as in states preparing to
join the EU, such as Austria which ac-
ceded in 1995.(Valenta, 2011, 2)Germany
accepted the most refugees out of any
European country at 320,000, while Aus-
tria admitted the second highest amongst
all non-Yugoslavian European countries
at 86,500.(Valenta, 2011, 4)The Yugoslav
wars, and especially the Bosnian conflict,
forced European states confronted with the
largest refugee crisis since WWII, to revise
their asylum policies, specify their vague
regulations on refugees, and attempt to de-
velop a unified policy in response to the
pressing issue.
A study of the response of the two
aforementioned host countries strongly af-
fected by the Bosnian crisis will help to ex-
plain integration prospects and realities of
the Bosnian refugee communities in both
countries. On a larger scale, it will illu-
minate the policy decisions of Germany,
Austria, and the EU as a whole regard-
ing the current Syrian refugee crisis. This
case will also serve as a means of under-
standing the responsibility liberal demo-
cratic states have vis-a`-vis refugees and the
means by which states are able to balance
the needs and expectations of its citizens
and refugees.(Gibney, 1999, 175)
Explaining the Case Studies
While Germany and Austria took in the
most refugees in proportion to their popu-
lations, they both initially had fierce anti-
immigration policies and no intention to
provide immediate permanent residency or
resettlement programs. However, Ger-
many was able to repatriate around 75%
of Bosnian refugees by 2005, while Austria
only repatriated less than 10%.(Valenta,
2011, 4) This study thus seeks to explain
why the migration policies of Germany and
Austria, which were initially aligned in
their anti-immigration goals at the begin-
ning of the Bosnian crisis, diverged by the
end.
This study analyzes Germany and Aus-
tria because they are historically and lin-
guistically linked and share similar cultur-
ally conservative values on the topic of im-
migration. They also both have compa-
rable waves of post-war migration, espe-
cially with regards to the large Turkish
migrant communities and smaller Bosnian
economic migrant groups initially permit-
ted to enter as “guest workers” until the
mid-1970s.(Kraler, 2011, 21-22) At the
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time of the crisis, both German and Aus-
trian citizenship were based heavily on
jus sanguinis, which negatively impacted
access to citizenship for Bosnian migrant
populations.(Brubaker, 1992, 52) While
both countries witnessed a large growth
in foreign-born populations in the post-
war era and an increase in asylum appli-
cations in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
they were reluctant to label their respective
countries as immigration states.(Jandl &
Kraler, 2003) These similarities only serve
to further highlight the paradoxical gaps
between both countries’ policy intentions
and realities.
Germany and Austria are both feder-
alist republics comprised of sixteen and
nine states (la¨nder), respectively and
share similar Parliamentary political sys-
tems. Additionally, Austria traditionally
has right-wing populist-party representa-
tion in Parliament (The Freedom Party
or FPO¨), whereas the German equivalent
(pro-Deutschland) has never been able to
enter the German parliament due to the
stigma of the Nazi-era politics. This adds
another layer of intrigue to the puzzle, as
Austria would be expected to have imple-
mented more anti-immigration legislation
with such a right-wing force in Parliament.
While these two states are generally com-
parable, it is also important to note sev-
eral distinctions that could assist in un-
derstanding policy divergences. Germany
is a much larger and more densely pop-
ulated country than Austria (at the time
of the crisis, Germany’s population aver-
aged around 80 million, while Austria’s was
slightly under 8 million). It also wields a
greater political and economic clout on the
continent, which influenced the degree of
autonomy it had with respect to its pol-
icy development and implementation. An-
other distinction from Austria is that in the
1990s, Germany was struggling with the so-
cial, political, and economic effects of re-
unification in addition to the mass influx
of Yugoslavian refugees. The compounded
effects of these challenges in Germany will
be further analyzed in relation to the de-
velopment of Bosnian refugee policies.
Methodology
On a theoretical level, this study aims
to understand the initial large influxes
of refugees in both countries by us-
ing three theoretical models (impartial-
ist, partialist, humanitarianist) to ex-
plain these states’ responses to Bosnian
refugees.(Singer, 1972; Walzer, 1983; Gib-
ney, 1999) The study also examines the in-
fluence of far-right parties and pro-migrant
interest groups in determining state policy
towards refugees and citizenship in order
to explain the divergence in German and
Austrian policies. On an empirical level,
UNHCR data will provide a background on
the refugee statistics in both countries and
their demographic concentrations through-
out the two countries. This study also
employs academic sources on the histori-
cal development of asylum policies in Ger-
many and Austria and analyzes news cov-
erage and political debates in order to trace
the path of asylum and refugee policy con-
vergence and divergence in Germany and
Austria. Particular attention is paid to
international press coverage of the crisis,
namely from the New York Times, the Los
Angeles Times, and Radio Free Europe.
The following analysis first situates
Germany and Austria’s specific policies in
the general European context of refugee
policy development during the post-war
years leading up to the Yugoslavian cri-
sis in 1991. Then, the stated objectives
and policy implementations of Germany
and Austria’s “temporary protection” pro-
grams for Bosnians are analyzed in the
context of both countries’ decision making
bodies and relevant interest groups that af-
fected the course of domestic politics. Fi-
nally, broader implications of Germany and
Austria’s policies are highlighted in order
to illuminate Europe’s current approach
towards the Syrian crisis.
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Historical Development of Post-War Europe Refugee Policies
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted by the United Na-
tions in 1948, states that “everyone has the
right to seek and enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.”(United Nations,
1948) While this was the first international
recognition of asylum as a human right, the
duty of states granting asylum remained
ambiguous. The 1951 Geneva Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees devel-
oped an official definition of a refugee and
outlined, albeit in vague terms, state obli-
gations to refugees. The subsequent 1967
Protocol increased the scope of the 1951
convention (initially designed to protect
post-war European refugees) by universal-
izing its applicability. The agreed upon
message was that states are legally obliged
to offer asylum to those who have a “well-
founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion.”(United Nations, 2010) States
are thus still under no duty to grant asy-
lum, but are obligated to admit refugees as
temporary residents.(Koser & Black, 1999,
524) While there are no clearly delineated
obligations by which states must abide,
besides the principle of non-refoulement,
permanent residence has been the tradi-
tional right accorded to refugees in Eu-
rope.(Koser & Black, 1999, 524)
During the first stage of the Bosnian
crisis in 1992, both Germany and Aus-
tria rejected many asylum applications of
Bosnian refugees through their own legal
interpretations of the 1951 refugee defini-
tion. The German Ministry of Interior
(which handles asylum applications) in-
sisted that government persecution was the
only valid claim to international protec-
tion.(United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, 1993, 2) Austrian officials
of the Bundesaylamt (Federal Asylum Of-
fice) similarly argued that if the appli-
cants could not demonstrate fear of in-
dividual persecution at the hands of the
state, then fleeing general violence perpe-
trated by private groups would not con-
stitute asylum.(Franz, 2010, 33-34) By the
time of the Bosnian crisis, Germany, Aus-
tria, and their Western European neigh-
bors had come to narrowly define what con-
stituted a refugee and tightened their asy-
lum laws. This was due to unprecedented
increases in asylum applications from indi-
viduals and groups arriving from outside
of Europe starting in the 1980s. Many
cases of fraudulent asylum were widely re-
ported regarding individuals using asylum
as a means of fleeing North-South economic
disparities.(Koser & Black, 1999, 525) In
relative terms, during the 1970s, asylum
applications averaged at 30,000 per year,
while in the 1980s, they increased tenfold
to 300,000 per year and more than dou-
bled to 680,000 by 1992.(United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, 1993,
3) Germany bore the majority of appli-
cations as the amount of asylum claims
spiked from 121,000 in 1989 to 438,000 in
1992.(United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, 1993, 4) Additionally, follow-
ing the collapse of the Soviet Union and
German reunification in 1990, what was
formerly West Germany became an eco-
nomic and political magnet for ethnic Ger-
mans and migrants from the former Soviet
block.(Woodward, 1995, 368) The ensuing
surge in labor supply increased unemploy-
ment and magnified the effects of Europe’s
recession in Germany.(Frank, 2009, 3) By
the time of the Bosnian crisis in 1992, Ger-
many had already taken tens of thousands
of Slovenes and Croats fleeing the violence
caused by Slovenian and Croatian seces-
sions in 1991.(Stets, 1992)
With a struggling economy and an in-
crease in migrant populations, the histor-
ical formula for xenophobia, social unrest
grew and far right wing movements quickly
rose in Germany. As New York Times
columnist Craig Whitney noted, socioe-
conomic divisions and lowered standards
of living in Austria “have been felt on a
larger scale in Germany, where an esti-
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mated half a million asylum-seekers and
half as many war refugees from the Balkans
have streamed into the country and caused
a right-wing backlash.”(Whitney, 1992) He
stated that while Austria witnessed right-
wing backlash, it “included little of the
neo-Nazi violence against foreigners that
has aﬄicted its larger neighbor.”(Whitney,
1992) Right wing gangs attacked and set
fire to migrant residences, and many East
German residents affected by unemploy-
ment rates of 50 to 70% supported their vi-
olent actions.(Woodward, 1995, 368) Fac-
ing international criticism1(Kinzer, 1992)
(including from Austria, which blamed
Germany’s closed borders for creating an
accumulation of refugees in Austria), as
well as domestic criticism (which came
mainly from church groups as well as ProA-
syl – a pro-immigrant NGO which en-
tered the political sphere during this time
by involving itself in parliamentary de-
bates), Germany slowly opened its borders
to Bosnian refugees. The government be-
gan easing visa restrictions and prioritiz-
ing the entry of the sick and wounded as
well as those with support networks al-
ready in place in Germany.(Stets, 1992)
Concurrently, however, the German Par-
liament was working on amending article
16 of the constitution— in effect presaging
the EU Dublin Agreement of 1997—which
would restrict asylum requests in Germany
to those arriving directly from an unsafe
country (those who arrived indirectly, as
the majority of Bosnians, would be ineli-
gible for asylum and subject to deporta-
tion).(Halibronner, 1994, 159) While it ap-
peared to open its borders, Germany was
still enforcing exclusionary asylum policies,
so the majority of the new Bosnians it al-
lowed in the country would not be accepted
as legal refugees and would instead be of-
fered “temporary protection.”
Temporary Protection Status in German and Austrian Refugee
Policies
“Temporary protection” or TPS (Tempo-
rary Protection Status) was the main way
in which European states chose to han-
dle the Bosnian crisis. As international
relations professor Barbara Franz argues,
TPS “resulted directly from attempts to
limit the scope and accessibility of the 1951
Convention for Bosnian refugees,” in or-
der to minimize and bypass the responsi-
bility states had towards refugees.(Franz,
2010, 29) Bypassing the asylum process for
these refugees by according them TPS re-
duced the financial burden on the state by
denying asylum-seekers entitlement to cer-
tain financial and social services that would
otherwise have been accorded to them as
refugees under the 1951 Convention defi-
nition.(Franz, 2005, 60) At the same time,
TPS satisfied public opinion and interna-
tional criticism concerned about human
rights, by offering refugees basic protection
and residence rights, albeit on a temporary
basis. While TPS was a common start-
ing point for both Germany and Austria,
the distinct ways in which it was imagined
and implemented in each country can ex-
plain in part the different results of massive
repatriation occurring in Germany and not
in Austria. When “temporary protection”
for Bosnians was declared to have ended
by UNHCR leader Sadako Ogata in 1997,
Germany interpreted it as a green light for
their massive repatriation effort. For Aus-
tria, on the other hand, this marked an
official acceptance of the permanent resi-
dency status of refugees who were initially
1UNHCR leader Sadako Otaga appealed to the German public in an op-ed on the front page
of Die Zeit, Germany’s most popular intellectual weekly journal: “Little Malawi, a barren African
country with eight million inhabitants, sheltered nearly one million people during the war in
Mozambique [. . . ] Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world, has opened its doors to
300,000 people who have fled from Burma. Does Europe have less to share than these countries?”
(Kinzer, 1992)
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offered “temporary protection.”(Koser &
Black, 1999, 528)
One explanation as to why TPS was
implemented differently in Germany than
in Austria relates to the composition of
the two governments. As was previously
mentioned, Austria and Germany are both
federal republics with strong parliaments.
Germany however, has a decentralized po-
litical system, which gives individual states
greater power in determining their own
policies. The sixteen states, for example,
have legal power and authority over refugee
affairs.(Walsh, 1992) Because of this decen-
tralized nature, it has been argued that
interest groups and domestic third par-
ties have a greater ability to intervene in
and influence state-level politics, which be-
comes more responsive and receptive to
third party pressure than national level
politics.(Karapin, 2007, 33-35) This thus
explains the lack of a coherent policy re-
garding Bosnian refugee TPS status not
only at the federal level, but also on the
state level, which adopted various stances
regarding the timeline for repatriation.
The German states thus became split
along geographical and political lines re-
garding repatriation, and their positions
also reflected the effect of third party in-
terest group activities. Schleswig-Holstein,
the northernmost German state, strongly
advocated for slowing refugee repatriation,
while the southernmost state of Bavaria
sought to speed up the process of repa-
triation. The debate sparked an essential
question for the “temporary protection”
policy. How long is “temporary”? Did
this “temporary” obligation to protect end
with the signing of the Dayton Peace Ac-
cords in 1995 officially ending the Bosnia-
Herzegovina war? Or was it after the first
Bosnian-Herzegovinan elections were held
in 1996, indicating that the country was
politically stable (if still corrupt)? For Al-
win Zeil, the interior minister for Branden-
burg and a proponent of rapid repatria-
tion: “we consider the civil war situation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina to have ended, with
the signing of the peace treaty.”(Walsh,
1992)
On September 20th 1996, the Ger-
man federal and state interior ministers an-
nounced that starting on October 1st, the
320,000 Bosnians in the country should be-
gin to return to their homes.(Cowell, 1996)
The statement also clarified that each state
would set the start time for its own repatri-
ation programs.(Bagshaw, 1997, 579) Even
though the UNHCR spokesperson Chris-
tiane Berthiaume emphasized in 1996 that
conditions in Bosnia were still not appro-
priate or safe for forced return after the
elections, the German states of Bavaria and
Baden-Wuttemburg (controlled by or allied
to the Christian Democratic government
of Chancellor Lohl in power) immediately
began “forcibly repatriating” Bosnians af-
ter October 1st.(Walker, 2010, 66) These
German states could be seen as expressing
the “partialist” response to refugees theo-
rized by Walzer.(Walzer, 1983) This anal-
ysis emphasizes the idea that individual
states (in this case local states that con-
stitute the German nation) have a right to
determine whether they are able to take
refugees or not and that state responsibil-
ity to outsiders is secondary to the pro-
tection of one’s own culture. This latter
theme was also discussed by conservative
and right-wing parties who were accused in
the press as being Islamophobic by reject-
ing the presence of Muslim Bosnians and
emphasizing a singular Christian nature of
Germany.(Stets, 1992)
For the states that delayed repatria-
tion, there were a variety of factors that ex-
plain their position. Some were under the
influence of liberal Social Democrats who
deplored the “shameful” acts of the con-
servative Christian Democrats and sought
to politically distinguish themselves by
declaring that repatriation should “be con-
ducted with moderation. A large percent-
age of them cannot yet return to their
homes.”(Walker, 2010, 68) Most states
that adopted these positions controlled ar-
eas in which the highest Bosnian refugee
populations were located, such as North
Rhine-Westphalia.(Eggleston, 1996) Addi-
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tionally, pro-migrant groups of Pro-Asyl
combined forces with local churches and
were best organized in theses areas of high-
Bosnian concentration to petition for de-
layed repatriation and more comprehen-
sive rights. Despite the extremely high
cost of supporting such large populations
of Bosnian refugees, the delayed repatria-
tion stance of these states is at least in part
a testament to the force of the pro-migrant
activist groups, which effectively lobbied
the state governments and appealed to the
German public by hosting mass candlelight
vigils and public demonstrations after the
September declaration.(Walsh, 1992)
While in Germany, state understand-
ings and reactions to TPS widely var-
ied, Austria’s centralized federal system al-
lowed for a more unified position on the
issue. Since the federal government invari-
ably exerted more power over the states,
the Austrian policy regarding TPS was
less amenable to local state opposition.
An examination of the actors in power
on the federal level that developed the
TPS policy reveals a liberal-leaning Aus-
trian parliament in power during the crisis.
Elected in 1990, the parliament consisted
of largely liberal SPD (Social Democratic
Party) members. Additionally, the Aus-
trian President Thomas Kestil was elected
in 1992 by the Conservative People’s Party
but distanced himself from the party line
as he pursued more policies in line with the
SPD during his presidency, including immi-
gration issues.(The Associated Press, 2004)
These factors partially explains the appar-
ent paradox of the low Bosnian repatriation
rates despite the presence of far-right par-
ties and popular xenophobia sentiments.
Initially, Bosnians arriving in Austria
covered under TPS were considered de-
facto refugees, but denied the right to work
or travel freely in the country.(Franz, 2005,
48) In the spring of 1992, however, the Aus-
trian Ministry of the Interior (which was
led by Franz Lo¨schnack of the Austrian So-
cialist Party and liberally dominated) de-
veloped the Bund-La¨nder Aktion (Federal-
Provincial Plan), which was designed as
an immediate relief program for displaced
Bosnians, providing food, shelter, health
care, and welfare, regulated by each Aus-
trian la¨nder.(Franz, 2005, 50-51) This plan,
which impacted over 91,000 Bosnians in
Austria, also opened the labor market for
Bosnians and granted them a limited right
of residence for those who were not able
to find refuge in another country.(Franz,
2010, 60) This right of residence was con-
tinuously extended from the initial end
date of June 30th 1994, to eventually July
31st 1998.(Franz, 2005, 51) Beginning in
1994, the new Minister of Interior, Caspar
Einem, (a Social Democrat) pushed for re-
form of the 1992 Aliens Act and Residence
Act. He emphasized the need to empower
the Federal Aliens Police (instead of the
local police who proved to be distributing
temporary residence titles arbitrarily), and
to focus on means of promoting “legal in-
tegration” of refugees under TPS.(Kraler,
2011, 34-5) While Parliamentary proposals
to reform the law in 1994 and 1996 failed
as a result of severe right-wing resistance,
the 1997 Aliens Act as desired by Einem
was finally passed.(Kraler, 2011, 34)
By 1998, Bosnians had been success-
fully integrated into Austrian society both
economically and socially as a result of
this program; the Austrian Ministry of
Interior estimated 65,000 Bosnians had
been incorporated into the labor market
by 1998.(Franz, 2005, 49)(Valenta, 2011,
11-12) Following in the spirit of pursuing
“integration before new immigration,” the
Austrian parliament passed the Bosnierge-
setz (Bosnians Law), which essentially up-
graded the de-facto refugee status of Bosni-
ans under TPS to a status of permanent
residence.(Kraler, 2011, 34) This in effect
allowed for what was so fervently opposed
by the creation of TPS at the beginning
of the conflict. The proposal allowed for
refugees who were admitted under TPS to
obtain a permanent residence permit that
was conditional upon proof of regular em-
ployment, private living and accommoda-
tions, and a clean criminal record.(Koser
& Black, 1999, 541) In essence, this tran-
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sition maintained somewhat the spirit of
TPS by allowing the state to select those
who would be granted permanent residence
and thus could become Austrian citizens
(after eight years of continuous residence),
which it would not otherwise been able to
have implemented had the Bosnians been
accepted under Conventional 1951 refugee
status.(Koser & Black, 1999, 529)
These liberal reforms, however, were
not implemented without right-wing resis-
tance. As previously mentioned, the Free-
dom Party and other conservative elements
prevented significant reform of the Aliens
and Residence Act until 1997. Prior to
this, in 1992, Jo¨rg Haider, the leader of the
Freedom Party (conservative right-wing),
launched a petition for a national referen-
dum entitled “Austria First!” where Aus-
trians would vote on a 12-point plan to end
foreign immigration and keep the propor-
tion of foreign children in public schools be-
low 30%. The petition failed miserably in
1993 and resulted in a parliamentary alien-
ation of the FPO and the creation of a new
party (the Liberal Forum) from prominent
FPO members who left in protest.(Wodak
& Pelinka, 2002) While the FPO main-
tained a consistently large public support
of around 25% for their anti-immigration
policies, they were never able to implement
their platform goals of ceasing immigration
in Parliament. The most pressure they
were able to exert on the government re-
sulted in a 1992 law that would make asy-
lum less accessible to economic immigrants
from Eastern Europe and tightened bor-
ders with Hungary.(Whitney, 1992) Thus
while the right-wing was publicly vocal
about its anti-immigrant stance and mus-
tered a popular backing, the Social Demo-
crat majority in Parliament wielded the
real power and ability to influence Aus-
trian border controls and implementation
of TPS, which resulted in the legal recog-
nition of Bosnians as permanent residents.
While other European governments
that applied TPS to Bosnian refugees fol-
lowed the Austrian trend of transitioning
their status into permanent residents, Ger-
many was the only country that main-
tained its position on the temporary na-
ture of Bosnian refugee protection.(Koser
& Black, 1999, 524) The issuance of TPS
for Bosnians did generate a debate amongst
German states and the federal govern-
ment, yet it only pertained to the ques-
tion of when it was appropriate to repa-
triate the Bosnian refugees. During the
discussions, there was never a significant
challenge posed to the fundamental base-
line stance that Bosnians would eventually
have to return home. During the 1994 elec-
tion season, for example, many candidates
appealed to voters’ concerns by emphasiz-
ing the principle that Yugoslavian refugees
would not be able to permanently remain
in Germany.(Whitney, 1994)
Since there was no change in mental-
ity regarding the temporary stay of the
Bosnian migrants in Germany, there were
no efforts made by the government to in-
tegrate Bosnian populations into German
society as there was in Austria with the
reform of the Residence Act in 1997 and
the Bosnians Law of 1998, which heavily
emphasized and promoted Bosnian integra-
tion. The German government’s form of
TPS included two different permits: “Dud-
lung” and “Aufenthaltsbefungis.”(Koser &
Black, 1999, 528) “Dudlung,” which trans-
lates to “toleration” is as one Bosnian
refugee described it “a permanent state
of suffering.”(Schneider, 2013) Bosnians
with “dudlung” status were prevented from
working or attending school and in a le-
gal state of “temporary suspension of de-
portation.”2(Lohre, 2009)(Luebben, 2003)
Bosnians with “aufenthaltsbefungis” sta-
tus, or temporary residence permits, were
assigned residence by the federal govern-
ment and their freedom of movement was
restricted.(Lohre, 2009) As Los Angeles
Times columnist Mary Walsh reported,
“Bosnians lead lives of near-invisibility
2For a comprehensive analysis on how living in legal limbo added to the psychological trauma
of Bosnian refugees in Germany see (Luebben, 2003).
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here, separated from the mainstream in
hostels, socializing at their own coffee-
houses, reading their own newspapers in
their own language.”(Walsh, 1992)
With no government-sponsored eco-
nomic or social integration incentives for
Bosnians who were largely kept inactive,
xenophobic clashes in Germany persisted
as Bosnians even began to be perceived by
many non-right-wing Germans as a liabil-
ity and a burden. As Barbara John, Com-
missioner for Foreigners in Berlin noted in
1995, “It hasn’t become a movement yet,
but I think the majority has the idea that
Bosnians should go home as soon as pos-
sible, because the German taxpayer has to
pay so much money.”(Walsh, 1992) The so-
cial welfare provided to refugees was in-
deed very costly to the German state and
federal governments. The German welfare
package was better than that provided by
the Austrians as it was of the same qual-
ity as the welfare received by German cit-
izens.(Walsh, 1992) Costing an estimated
$7 billion a year to provide for a wel-
fare payment of $380 per month for each
Bosnian adult and $190 per month for each
Bosnian child in addition to the necessary
housing and medical costs, Bosnian pres-
ence in Germany was expensive to main-
tain, especially during times of economic
hardship.(Walsh, 1992)
While the federal government main-
tained a policy of voluntary return, more
German states were deciding to forcibly
repatriate Bosnian refugees (though not all
agreed on when it would be appropriate
to do so). By the end of the 1990s, Ger-
many thus repatriated 347,419 individuals
to Bosnia, almost 70% of total Bosnian
repatriations in Europe.(Franz, 2010, 51)
criticism3 Ultimately, both Austria and
Germany adopted a “humanitarianist” ap-
proach to accepting refugees. As Gibney
articulates, states have an obligation to
assist refugees if it does not pose an un-
due burden (as it was financially in Ger-
many), and must learn to balance moral
justification and citizen interest, which in
both Germany and Austria included strong
pro-migrant and anti-migrant activists and
popular sentiment.(Gibney, 1999, 75) Both
countries thus adopted restrictive and lib-
eral policies regarding Bosnian refugee en-
try and legal status, but ultimately chose
one over the other in accordance with their
respective political frameworks.
Germany had hoped that admitting
Bosnian refugees under shared European
TPS policies would mean burden shar-
ing, but it clearly did not as each coun-
try interpreted TPS differently and 85%
of all Bosnians in the EU were contained
in three countries: Germany (with over
60% of Bosnians), Austria (at 15%), and
Sweden (at 10%).(Koser & Black, 1999,
524) Additionally, German attempts to in-
troduce legislation in the European Com-
munity, which would oblige each of the
twelve members to accept more Yugosla-
vian refugees failed to pass.(Kinzer, 1992)
While the “temporary protection” regime
in Europe was celebrated by the UN as
the first step towards a consolidation of
European asylum policies, its discordant
implementations showed that Europe still
faced many hurdles in its path towards the
ideal goal of the European Union.(Koser
& Black, 1999, 523) Since the Bosnian cri-
sis, there have been more concerted efforts
to coordinate migration and asylum poli-
cies with the Dublin Regulation of 1997
in which the first state through which an
asylum seeker entered is the only one able
to process their asylum application. Ulti-
mately, individual member states have re-
tained their own individual asylum laws.
Applications for the Current Syrian Crisis
Both the Bosnian and the current Syr-
ian crises have highlighted the weaknesses
of European asylum policies. While the
3see(Valenta & Strabac, 2013) Figure 3 for a relative comparison of European repatriation rates
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Bosnian crisis highlighted the lack of a co-
herent European structure regarding asy-
lum and empowered the creation of the
Dublin Regulation by preventing refugees
from “asylum-shopping” from country to
country, the Syrian crisis has challenged
this very legislation by demonstrating the
burden it places on peripheral states of
the EU who have received unprecedented
amounts of refugees at their borders. These
two cases raise the question of how to cre-
ate a coherent asylum policy that would
satisfy all member states and share the bur-
den equitably. Inherent to this question is
the basic notion of whether or not states
have shared obligations and responsibilities
as collective entities.
The German history of TPS and mas-
sive Bosnian repatriation should not be
repeated with the Syrians, as depriving
refugees of work and school rights while
waiting for the violence to end proved to
be unsuccessful. This policy was disastrous
not only for the psychological well-being of
the refugees, but also for discouraging in-
tegration and exacerbating xenophobic and
social tensions while depleting state welfare
funds.
Moreover, the ethical implications of
repatriation and its timing must also be
heavily weighted regarding the status of
Syrian refugees in Europe. Germany’s ex-
tensive repatriation policy created minor-
ity enclaves in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
increased the internally displaced popu-
lation in Bosnia, which did not help to
rebuild and stabilize the war-torn coun-
try.(Franz, 2010, 51) The early Austrian
model of handling Bosnian refugees was by
no means ideal in the sense that it was also
exclusionary and initially deprived Bosni-
ans of basic rights. However, the evolution
of TPS to finally integrate refugees and rec-
ognize them as legal permanent residents
and ultimately compatriots is worthy of
emulation in the Syrian case. Ultimately,
the European Union and the international
community will have to develop an ideally
coherent response to the unique Syrian cri-
sis, keeping in mind the successes and fail-
ures of the Bosnian experience in Germany
and Austria.
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